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The business and economics of the NHL are changing, and its completely disrupted player contracts and certain elements of team-building strategy.
We have a booming salary cap and a new era of player empowerment.
The weakness of this years unrestricted free-agency class was the catalyst for a wild trade market.
Leo Carlssons shocking five-year, $90 million offer sheet from Philadelphia, which Anaheim ultimately matched, will have major ramifications for the restricted free-agent marketplace moving forward.
Advertisement With the dust beginning to settle on the offseason, lets reflect on some trends in how the NHL is shifting.
Were not going to dive into the player empowerment angle or the effect of the Carlsson offer sheet, as those topics are too large (they would deserve their own stories) for the scope of this piece.
The RFA market is exploding The RFA market is changing completely, with young players getting the bag sooner than ever.
Its deserved because in the 2010s, it felt like many impact players were criminally underpaid during their RFA years and then, ironically, overpaid when they became UFA-eligible.
Player salaries werent aligned with aging curves, but thats definitely shifting.
Carlssons $18 million AAV offer sheet has completely disrupted the marketplace for franchise forwards coming off their ELCs.
Pavel Dorofeyev inked a giant, seven-year, $11 million AAV deal with the Rangers despite being a winger with a career-high of 64 points.
Nearly all RFAs are benefiting from this new cap world, not just the cream of the crop.
Jack Drury, for example, an above-average bottom-six center coming off a 27-point season, earned a lucrative five-year, $22.5 million contract with Nashville after being traded there.
Young defensemen coming off their ELCs even ones that arent fully established or proven are being paid more handsomely on their second contracts than ever before.
In the flat-cap era, only star No.
1 defenders such as Cale Makar, Quinn Hughes and Miro Heiskanen were earning massive long-term contracts.
Everyone who fell short of that franchise defenseman bar usually settled for cheaper bridge deals and was forced to wait until their third contract to get their huge paydays.
The contracts were quite cheap, even after you look at cap hit percentage and convert those AAVs to 2026-27 equivalent figures.
Player | Signing Year | Contract signed | 2026-27 AAV equivalent | Cap % | Points/GP During ELC | ATOI During ELC | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| 2021 | $6M x 3 | $7.7M x 3 | 7.4% | 0.54 | 20:44 | | 2023 | $3.9M x 2 | $4.89M x 2 | 4.7% | 0.49 | 18:49 | | 2023 | $3.87M x 2 | $4.78M x 2 | 4.6% | 0.35 | 21:14 | | 2022 | $4M x 3 | $4.99M x 3 | 4.8% | 0.45 | 18:16 | | 2023 | $1.6M x 2 | $1.98M x 2 | 1.9% | 0.35 | 19:27 | | 2023 | $2.3M x 3 | $2.91M x 3 | 2.8% | 0.35 | 19:39 | | 2023 | $3.85M x 2 | $4.78M x 2 | 4.6% | 0.47 | 19:57 | | 2022 | $1.4M x 2 | $1.77M x 2 | 1.7% | 0.32 | 15:53 | | 2022 | $1.7M x 2 | $2.18M x 2 | 2.1% | 0.42 | 19:36 | | 2021 | $4.4M x 3 | $5.6M x 3 | 5.4% | 0.48 | 22:38 | This summer, though, Simon Nemec, Pavel Mintyukov and Brandt Clarke have reset the market for non-star defensemen on second contracts.
None of them are proven top-pair defenders yet they all averaged less than 19 minutes per game over their ELCs, and Nemec and Mintyukov, in particular, also have very rough defensive metrics yet they signed lucrative deals that simply wouldnt have been possible three to five years ago.
Advertisement The rise of medium-term contracts The fascinating part about the Nemec and Mintyukov contracts is that on top of commanding high AAVs, they signed for only five years, which sets them up to become UFA-eligible at 27 years old.
That means if they break out, theyll be in the perfect age range to cash in a mega contract in 2031 when the cap is even higher.
Carlssons five-year offer sheet walks him to UFA status at 26.
Trevor Zegras followed the mid-range template with the four-year, $9.125 million AAV contract extension he signed with the Flyers, which will make him a UFA at 29.
Moving forward, I expect well see more top RFAs consider signing medium-term contracts in the four- to five-year range.
Four to five years is a sweet spot for players, where they secure more guaranteed money than shorter, cheaper two- to three-year bridge deals, but by avoiding max-term contracts, it allows them to negotiate another deal while theyre still in their prime, and when the cap has moved much higher.
Its sensible because how many times has a young budding star such as Jack Hughes ($8 million AAV) or Dylan Guenther ($7.14 million AAV) signed for seven or eight years coming off of their ELC, only for their contract to look like a ridiculous steal in short order? This isnt to say seven-year-and-longer deals are completely dead; weve seen players like Zach Benson and Tyson Foerster commit long-term recently, but it is happening less frequently.
In the calendar year 2025, 15 players with RFA rights signed contracts that were at least seven years long.
So far in 2026, were only at five: Josh Doan, Benson, Ivan Demidov, Dorofeyev and Tyson Foerster.
Teams are trading first-round picks away more aggressively The way teams value and leverage first-round picks on the trade market is clearly shifting.
This offseason, there have been 11 pick-for-player trades in which a first-rounder was dealt, and five of those 11 transactions included not just one but multiple first-round picks.
In total, there were 17 first-round picks dealt across those 11 pick-for-player moves.
Player Acquired | Return | |---|---| Marcus Pettersson (NYR) | 2030 1st round pick (VAN) | Sebastian Cossa (UTA) | No.
23 pick (DET) | Mason McTavish (STL) | No.
15 pick, No.
29 pick (ANA) | Pavel Dorofeyev (NYR) | No.
26 pick, 2028 1st, 2026 3rd (VGK) | JJ Peterka (BOS) | No.
23 pick and Florida's 2028 1st (UTA) | Bowen Byram (CHI) | No.
4 pick, No.
45 pick, Louis Crevier (BUF) | Jordan Kyrou (WSH) | No.
16 pick, Connor McMichael, Milton Gastrin (STL) | William Eklund (OTT) | No.
9 pick (SJ) | Simon Nemec (CGY) | Vegas' 2027 1st round pick, Colorado's 2028 1st round pick, No.
35 pick (NJ) | Brady Tkachuk (FLA) | No.
9 pick, No.
25 pick, 2029 1st, 2027 2nd (OTT) | Mackie Samoskevich (SEA) | No.
25 pick, 2027 2nd | Add that to the flurry of firsts that were dealt ahead of the trade deadline, and were up to 23 first-round picks that have changed hands in 2026 so far.
That seemed like a very high number considering theres still five and a half months to go in the year, so I stacked it up compared to previous years, and you can see a clear upward trajectory: Teams are trading firsts away far more aggressively than they used to.
Whats causing this uptick? Its a combination of factors.
Firstly, the league is in an interesting spot, with nearly every front office under pressure to improve its short-term competitiveness and win more games in 2026-27.
Vancouver is the only team in the NHL that is at the start of a lengthy rebuild and can accept a lot of losing next year everyone else is either already a playoff contender, retooling or has spent enough time rebuilding that standings progress is necessary (eg: Chicago).
This means theres an overwhelming number of buyers in the marketplace.
Couple that sky-high demand with an awful free-agent class that lacked impact talent, and its one of the main catalysts why so many top picks were traded.
Advertisement In fact, the 31st- (Blackhawks), 30th- (Rangers), 29th- (Flames), and 27th-place (Kraken) teams from last season account for six of the 17 first-round picks (35 percent) that were moved this summer.
Another reason for this increased aggressiveness is teams realizing that late first-round picks arent as valuable as they once were.
Colleague Dom Luszczyszyns research showed that late firsts are dropping considerably in value compared with the last 15-20 years.
Graph courtesy of Dom Luszczyszyn With the rapid growth of analytics, teams are becoming more efficient at drafting in the top 15.
That means your odds of landing a diamond in the rough in the 20s are diminishing its not impossible, but its harder than it used to be.
From 2017 to 2019, for example, only six of the 36 players (16.7 percent) drafted in the 20s of the first round became top-six forwards, top-four defensemen or starting goaltenders.
With those odds in mind, Cup contenders have never been more willing to throw their firsts away for win-now help.
The diminished value of late firsts may also explain why teams are more willing to bundle multiple firsts together in trade packages.
In the past, it wasnt very common for teams to trade multiple firsts for a single player.
From 2019 to 2024, it happened only twice: The 2021 Seth Jones trade and the 2022 Brandon Hagel trade.
It increased to two times in 2025 (the Noah Dobson and Mikko Rantanen trades), but then we saw it occur five times in the span of a week this summer.
Player Acquired | Return | |---|---| Mason McTavish (STL) | No.
15 pick, No.
29 pick (ANA) | Pavel Dorofeyev (NYR) | No.
26 pick, 2028 1st, 2026 3rd (VGK) | JJ Peterka (BOS) | No.
23 pick and Florida's 2028 1st (UTA) | Simon Nemec (CGY) | Vegas' 2027 1st round pick, Colorado's 2028 1st round pick, No.
35 pick (NJ) | Brady Tkachuk (FLA) | No.
9 pick, No.
25 pick, 2029 1st, 2027 2nd (OTT) | Interestingly, it wasnt just proven stars such as Brady Tkachuk and Dorofeyev who fetched these prices; young, high-pedigree players who were falling out of favor did as well.
JJ Peterka, for example, has electrifying potential, but hes an average-sized winger coming off an underwhelming 47-point campaign and a zero-point playoff run.
In the past, that kind of player would have never commanded multiple firsts.
However, Boston could justify the cost because while two first-round picks might cause headline shock, the reality is they only gave up this years No.
23 pick and Floridas 2028 first-rounder, which they acquired in the Brad Marchand trade.
Knowing what we know now about the value of late firsts, it doesnt seem like such a wild price to pay for a proven top-six scorer.
Advertisement The skyrocketing salary cap isnt saving Cup contenders from cap crunches Last summer, when the Panthers leveraged the $7.5 million increase in the cap and miraculously found a way to keep their three big pending UFAs, Sam Bennett, Brad Marchand and Aaron Ekblad, without shedding meaningful talent elsewhere, some wondered whether the skyrocketing cap would be a silver bullet for contending teams to keep their entire core together.
Were the days of Cup contenders navigating complex cap crunches over? Especially since overpriced contracts were far easier to ship out compared to the flat-cap era? However, this summer has proven that the rising cap isnt just a get-out-of-jail-free card for win-now teams trying to keep the band together.
Florida was a unique case because all three took significant discounts to stay; for some other contenders, player salaries are inflating too fast.
The Golden Knights traded Dorofeyev for contract/cap reasons.
The Avalanche were forced to ship out three excellent supporting cast players in Valeri Nichushkin, Jack Drury and Ross Colton due to their cap crunch.
The Stars traded Mavrik Bourque for cap reasons, and its still unknown whether they have enough space to re-sign Jason Robertson.
The Sabres let Alex Tuch walk in free agency and traded Bowen Byram knowing they couldnt afford his next contract.
All of these teams are still very formidable their contender status is not in jeopardy with these losses but they are weaker, and its clear that teams will still have tough cap decisions to make.
Contenders such as Carolina and Montreal, which have most of their core already signed long-term, are in a very enviable position.
Depth/role players are winning in free agency (but only the ones with desirable traits) Star players, RFAs and middle-class UFAs have all seen notable salary jumps in this escalating cap world, but what about players further down the lineup? Are depth/role players seeing similar gains? Interestingly, this has been more of a case-by-case basis.
Some, such as A.J.
Greer ($4.25 million x four years), Michael McCarron ($3.33 million x six years), Beck Malenstyn ($2.92 million x six years), Jeffrey Viel ($2.5 million x five years), Vincent Desharnais ($4.2 million x four years), and Colton Sissons ($4.25 million x two years), have definitely cashed in.
But this doesnt mean that all UFAs are feasting: Anthony Mantha settled for a modest two-year, $4.75 million AAV contract despite coming off a 31-goal season.
Jack Roslovic only got two years of term at a modest $4 million after a second consecutive 20-plus-goal season.
Andrei Kuzmenko took a one-year contract again.
Teddy Bluegers two-year, $2.5 million AAV contract with Toronto has a slightly lower cap-hit percentage than what Pittsburgh paid him in 2021; hes not seeing any huge benefit from the rising cap.
Advertisement Its easy to spot the trend for why some of these depth/role UFAs got the bag, whereas others didnt; it comes down to the desirability and universal appeal of their traits.
Malenstyn, Greer and Viel are big, rugged, fast, hard-working and physical.
Every team loves depth wingers like that; theyre heart-and-soul players that GMs will gladly overpay for.
Desharnais plays a premium position as a right-shot defender, and Sissons and McCarron are right-handed centers who are strong in the faceoff dot.
Whether you think these qualities are overrated or not, NHL front offices covet them and will pay a premium for them.
Mantha and Roslovic, meanwhile, are inconsistent scorers who produce a lot in the regular season but continually disappoint in the playoffs.
One-dimensional middle-six wingers like them and Kuzmenko just arent going to get lucrative contracts despite scoring points at very healthy rates.
Blueger isnt in high demand either because he doesnt have the size, physicality, speed, or elite faceoff ability to stand out compared to other bottom-six centers.
In other words, if youre a depth/role UFA, youre not automatically entitled to a significant pay bump because of the cap increase.
You need to have distinguishing traits or fill a highly desired niche to see the benefits.
All contract data courtesy PuckPedia.